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Unconscionability in Canadian
Contract Law
S.M. WADDAMS*
Although sales statutes in the common law provinces of Canada
have no precise equivalent of section 2-302 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code' ("U.C.C."), a number of statutes in each jurisdiction pro-
vide for relief against unfair contractual provisions in various
contexts. In some cases, the statutes authorize courts to exercise dis-
cretion in setting aside unfair terms. 2 In other contexts, specific con-
tractual terms are prohibited 3 or mandated statutorily.4
Canada shares with the United States the traditions of English
common law and equity underlying section 2-302. As such, Canadian
law recognizes the concept of relief against forfeitures and penalties.5
Canadian courts often exercise their general power over contract for-
mation and interpretation either to exclude unfair provisions or mod-
ify them by incorporating implied terms.6
* Professor of Law, University of Toronto. B.A., University of Toronto, 1963; LL.B.,
University of Toronto, 1967; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1968; M.A., Cambridge Univer-
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1. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
2. See Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 18, § 99(2) (1979); Insurance Act,
R.S.O. ch. 218, § 106 (1980); Solicitors Act, R.S.O. ch. 478, § 26 (1980); Unconscionable
Transactions Relief Act, R.S.O. ch. 513, § 2 (1980). The trade practices acts in various prov-
inces have a similar effect on certain classes of transactions. See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C.
ch. 406, § 4(e) (1979); Trade Practices Inquiry Act, R.S.M. ch. TI 10, § 2 (1979); Trade Prac-
tices Act, Nfld. R.S. ch. 10, § 6(d) (1978); Business Practices Act, R.S.O. ch. 55, § 2(b)(vi)
(1980); Business Practices Act, R.S.P.E.I. ch. 31, § 3(bXvi) (1977).
3. For example, disclaimer clauses are prohibited in consumer sales. See Sale of Goods
Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 370, § 20 (1979); Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M. ch. C-200, § 58(1)
(1970); Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, R.S.N.B. ch. C-18.1, §§ 24-26 (1978);
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.N.S. ch. 53, § 20c (1967), amended by S.N.S. ch. 19 (1975);
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. ch. 87, § 34(1) (1980); Consumer Products Warranties Act,
S.S. ch. C-30, §§ 8, 11 (1978). Certain terms in residential tenancies are also prohibited. See,
e.g., Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. ch. 232, § 84(1) (1980).
4. Examples of mandatory terms include insurance policies and contracts for the sale of
agricultural machinery. See, e.g., Farm Implement Act, S.A. ch. F-4.1 (1982); Farm Machin-
ery and Equipment Act, R.S.M. ch. F-40 (1970); Insurance Act, R.S.O. ch. 218, § 207 (1980);
Farm Implement Act, R.S.P.E.I. ch. F-3 (1974); Agricultural Implements Act, S.S. ch. A-10
(1978).
5. See S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 327-45 (2d ed. 1984).
6. Id. at 362-76.
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The doctrine of unconscionability is well-established in Canada.
Unconscionability is generally defined as taking undue advantage of
an inequality in bargaining power. 7 Thus, a number of modem Cana-
dian cases, relying on equity jurisdiction, have set aside contracts for
unconscionability.a Contracts may be set aside for duress, including
economic duress.9 Closely related are the cases of undue influence
and fiduciaries.10
In cases involving disclaimer clauses, Canadian courts often use
the theory of "fundamental breach," which developed in England. 1
This theory ostensibly relies on the technique of construction holding
that parties to a contract could not have intended that the disclaimer
clause apply in cases involving a fundamental breach.1 2 Nonetheless,
few commentators have doubted that the doctrine originates in the
desire to set aside unfair clauses. 13 As noted, statutes in several prov-
inces make disclaimer clauses void in consumer sales. 14 Yet, follow-
ing a decision of the House of Lords,15 the Canadian Supreme Court
in Hunter Engineering, Inc. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. 16 held that dis-
claimer clauses in commercial contexts should be given effect accord-
ing to their true construction. 17 Significantly, however, the court
limited this holding by recognizing its general power to set aside
either, in the words of two judges, an unconscionable contractual pro-
vision, or, in the words of two others, a provision that should not be
7. See Bradley E. Crawford, Comment, Restitution- Unconscionable Transaction-Un-
due Advantage Taken of Inequality Between Parties, 44 CAN. B. REy. 142, 143 (1966); see also
WADDAMS, supra note 5, at 380-84.
8. See, e-g., Morrison v. Coast Fin. Ltd., [1966] 54 W.W.R. 257 (B.C.C.A.); Deglman v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 1954 S.C.R. 725 (Can.); County of Carleton v. City of Ottawa, 52
D.L.R.2d 220 (1965) (Can.).
9. WADDAMS, supra note 5, at 376-80; see also North Ocean Shipping Co. v. Hyundai
Constr. Co., [1979] 1 Q.B. 705 (Eng.); The "Siboen" and the "Sibotre", [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
293 (Eng.); The "Alev", [19891 1 Lloyd's Rep. 138 (Eng.); Atlas Express Ltd. v. Kafco (Im-
porters and Distributors) Ltd., [1989] 1 Q.B. 833 (Eng.); Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls
(Contractors) Ltd., [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 (Eng. C.A.).
10. WADDAMS, supra note 5, at 384-89.
11. Id. at 350-51.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., id. at 350, 356; Brian Coote, The Effects of Discharge by Breach on Excep-
tion Clauses, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 221 (1970); J.A. Weir, Comment, Nec Tamen Consumdbatur
-... Frustration and Limitation Clauses, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (1970).
14. See supra note 3.
15. Photo Prod. Ltd. v. Securicor Transp. Ltd. [1980] App. Cas. 827 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
16. 57 D.L.R.4th 321 (1989).
17. See id.
542 [Vol. 14:541
Unconscionability Law in Canada
enforced in the particular circumstances of the case.' 8 Some uncer-
tainty remains about the precise scope of relief because the majority of
the court was evenly divided.19 Nevertheless, whichever form of
words prevails in future cases, the decision of the Canadian Supreme
Court in Hunter Engineering, Inc. establishes that a general power
exists to set aside contractual provisions on what may broadly be
called grounds of unfairness.
In contrast, English courts generally do not recognize unconscio-
nability as a contractual defense.20 This is partly on account of the
United Kingdom's Unfair Contract Terms Act 21 and the general
mood of judicial conservatism prevailing in English courts.22
Although Canadian contract law traditionally follows English law, re-
cent cases indicate that Canadian law will, on this point, take its own
path. Reference has already been made to the Canadian Supreme
Court decision in Hunter Engineering, Inc. ,23 dealing with the issue of
disclaimer clauses. Since Canada's 1982 adoption of a bill of rights, 24
the Canadian courts, unlike the English courts, have become accus-
tomed to dealing with general policy issues. It seems unlikely that
Canadian courts will retreat from recognizing a general defense of
unfairness. Whether unconscionability is the term that will ultimately
be adopted remains to be seen.
Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of section 2-302, favored
open recognition of a general principle of unconscionability. 25 He
thought that such a principle was more reliable and rational than the
tortuous use of judicial techniques, such as construction. 26 There is
much in the Canadian experience to bear out Llewellyn's thesis. For
18. See id. at 382. The court also discussed "the context of the particular breach which
had occurred," and "a residual power residing in the court to withhold its assistance on policy
grounds in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 378, 381.
19. See id at 382.
20. See National Westminster Bank Plc. v. Morgan, [1985] 1 App. Cas. 686 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
21. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50.
22. In the tort context, see Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [1991] 1 App. Cas. 398
(appeal taken from Eng.) (repudiating an earlier willingness to recognize a general principle of
liability for economic loss in negligence cases).
23. 57 D.L.R.4th 321 (1989). For a discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court's deci-
sion, see supra notes 16-19.
24. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
25. Karl Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Conti-
nental Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939) (book review).
26. Id.
1992]
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example, under the influence of the fundamental breach doctrine, the
law of disclaimer clauses became arbitrary and unpredictable, and led
the courts to wrong results in both directions: courts enforced unfair
clauses and struck down clauses that were fair and reasonable. The
same has happened with the law relating to penalty clauses. General
recognition of a judicial power to control contracts for unfairness is
welcomed, though it is a power to be used with restraint. Such power
must always be balanced against the need for a measure of certainty,
stability, and predictability.
